Identifying and combating disinformation

The following bodies, in particular, are responsible for identifying disinformation campaigns:

• intelligence services,
• other security agencies of the Federation (among others, the Federal Criminal Police Office, the Federal Office for the Protection of the Constitution).

The press, broadcasters and other media also have a special responsibility to identify disinformation campaigns.

Disinformation is countered most effectively by factual and reliable information. The following bodies, in particular, undertake preventive public relations work and take care of rectifying false information in specific areas:

• Federal and Land returning officers - election procedure,
• Federal Agency for Civic Education and its regional centres - general information on Bundestag elections and political parties,
• Press and Information Office of the Federal Government - measures, legislation, strategies and background information relating to federal government policies,
• political parties and candidates running for election - political content/election campaigns.
• The press, broadcasters and other media also play a central role in informing and educating the general public. They counter the spread of false or misleading information by reporting objectively and identifying false information, for instance by fact checkers. 

Promoting the population’s media and digital literacy also helps to contain the spread of false information. The critical evaluation of information presupposes an understanding of how news is produced, and by whom. A basic technical understanding is also required of the way in which digital technologies work and how news spreads, for instance in the social media.

The neutrality of the electoral bodies laid down in law and the constitutional principle guaranteeing the public nature of elections are fundamental prerequisites of the population’s trust in the election organisation and its acceptance of the election result. All essential parts of the electoral process can be scrutinised by the public. Electoral law also provides for control instruments to guarantee the proper conduct of the election. The following arrangements, in particular, ensure that the election result is established correctly:

• votes are given on ballot papers to document the voters’ decisions in a physical manner and can be recounted at any time,
• discussions and deliberations of the electoral boards and committees take place in meetings open to the public of which minutes are taken,
• the members of electoral boards and committees come from all parts of society (“more eyes are better”, members check each other’s work),
• an electoral scrutiny procedure may be carried out by the Bundestag and the Federal Constitutional Court to check whether election errors have been made.

When the provisional election result is determined, IT is used in part of the process. The municipalities and electoral bodies have the power to decide which hardware and software will be used. They are responsible for the security of their own IT. The BSI supports them in their security efforts.

A cyber attack on the IT infrastructure used to determine and transmit the provisional results may for instance delay the announcement of the provisional election result. However, the composition of the newly elected Bundestag depends solely on the final election result, which will be available roughly three weeks after election day.

The final election result is determined on the basis of the election records, which are physical documents. It can therefore not be manipulated by cyber attacks. Checks are possible at any time as ballot papers are used and the electoral committees, which determine the result, keep written records. As a rule, these records are preserved until 60 days before the next election.

• When voters apply for postal voting documents, this is noted in the voters’ register. Then these voters need their polling cards, which have been issued for that purpose by the municipality, to vote in the polling station or by postal ballot in the Bundestag election. Voters have to return their polling cards to the municipality together with the completed postal voting documents. Multiple voting is thus prevented.
• Postal voters have to give an affirmation in lieu of an oath on their polling cards. They confirm that they have marked the ballot paper themselves. Giving a false affirmation in lieu of an oath is punishable. Anyone who marks someone else’s ballot paper will also be liable to prosecution. This does not apply to people who have been asked by a voter to help mark the ballot paper because the voter is prevented by a physical impairment from marking it himself or herself.
• If postal voting documents are sent elsewhere than the residential address, the municipality will also send a letter to the residential address to inform the voter. Registered voters would therefore notice if anyone falsely applied for postal voting documents in their name.
• Postal voting documents may only be given to someone other than the person eligible to vote if the former presents a written proxy. One person may collect postal voting documents for no more than four voters and must show an identity card or passport if asked to.